Introduction
Online hate speech is believed to play an important role in the advocacy of terrorism. 1 This is certainly true in the case of the Islamic State ‫ﺍاﻹﺳﻼﻣﻴﯿﺔ(‬ ‫ﺍاﻟﺪﻭوﻟﺔ‬ , ISIS / ISIL / IS / Daesh ), which has used an effective online propaganda machine to spread fundamentalist views on Islam, to recruit members and to incite fear and violence.
Examples include their digital magazine
Dabiq and videos issued by the al-Hayāt Media Center, 3 but also the network of selfradicalized (or radicalizing) followers on social networks such as Twitter. On February 5, 2016, Twitter issued a press release to speak out against the use of their platform for the promotion of terrorism. 4 They reported suspending over 125,000 user profiles that endorsed acts of terrorism, remarking that "there is no 'magic algorithm' for identifying terrorist content on the internet, so global online platforms are forced to make challenging judgment calls based on very limited information and guidance."
Data collection
We have collected a corpus of online jihadist hate speech that consists of 49,311 "tweets"
(public messages of no more than a 140 characters) posted by 367 Twitter users, henceforth the HATE corpus. As a counterweight, we have also collected a corpus of 35,166 tweets by 66
users that talk about Islam, Iraq, Syria, Western culture, and so on, without spreading hate speech, henceforth the SAFE corpus. Both corpora were extensively double-checked.
The SAFE corpus consists of tweets posted by reporters, imams and Muslims, for example @HalaJaber (a Lebanese-British journalist), @TRACterrorism (Terrorist Research & Analysis Consortium), @BBCArabic, @TheNobleQuran and @AppleSUX (an ISIS parody account). To balance the size of both corpora we added 15,000 random tweets from as many Twitter users to the SAFE corpus, on any topic from cooking to sports, in any language.
The HATE corpus was gradually expanded from October 2014 to December 2016. With each update we manually identified new subversive profiles and automatically collected tweets from all of them using the Pattern toolkit 13 and the Twitter API. Content was mainly collected in the aftermath of 10 incidents during this time period: 14 1. Charlie Hebdo shootings (January 7, 2015) . Saïd (34) and Chérif Kouachi (32) force their way into the offices of the French satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, armed with automatic rifles, killing 20 and injuring 22. We collected approximately 15,000 tweets.
12 Ali Fisher. "How Jihadist Networks Maintain a Persistent Online Presence," Perspectives on Terrorism 9, no. 3 (2015) . 14 "List of Islamist terrorist attacks, " Wikipedia, November 24, 2017, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Islamist_terrorist_attacks CTRS-007 6/31 2. Sinai attacks (January 29, 2015) . Over 25 ISIS-affiliated militants target police offices, an army base and security checkpoints in Egypt, armed with mortars and car bombs, killing 44 and injuring 62. We collected approximately 10,000 tweets.
3. Atatürk Airport attack (June 20, 2015) . Three or four ISIS-affiliated militants stage an attack at Turkey's international airport, armed with automatic rifles and explosive belts, killing 30 and injuring 104. We collected approximately 1,000 tweets.
4. Paris attacks (November 13, 2015) . Three ISIS suicide bombers strike at Stade de
France during a football match, followed by shootings at restaurants by another three and finally a shooting at the Bataclan theatre by three more, in total killing 137 and injuring 368. We collected approximately 7,500 tweets.
5. Brussels bombings (March 22, 2016 All of the known perpetrators appear to be men and, where age is known, most of them young adults aged 20-35. Over time we observed how attacks became more improvised, with smaller teams of perpetrators often using more improvised weapons such as trucks. We also collected increasingly smaller amounts of tweets (see Figure 1) 
Automatic collection
We used the Pattern toolkit for the Python programming language to automatically collect tweets posted by our set of manually identified profiles. A sample is shown in Figure 5 . An example Python script is shown below. It will store the most recent tweets posted by @BBC in a CSV file (comma-separated values) while discarding duplicates that it has already seen. The HATE corpus primarily consists of tweets posted in direct response to terrorist attacks. We did not study how tweets prior to an attack might have fueled the event. Following is a selection of tweets in the corpus and a short discussion of their characteristics. In general, jihadist rhetoric on social media appears to be riddled with spelling errors, slang, sarcasm, juvenile boasting, bonding (e.g., ‫ﺍاﺥخ‬ , akh, brother) and emoticons -in particular the raised index finger ( ) and tears of joy ( ).
Europe will spend the rest if its miserable days on tender hooks
Posted by @bintislamiya19 (March 22, 2016) Les mecs executent les otages trkl oklm, malgre le fait que l'armee (aussi incompetente soit-elle) les traque #fusillade
Posted by @Aljabarti45 (November 13, 2015)
Allahu Akbaaaar Allahu Akbaaaaar Daulatul Islamiya baqiya watatamadad
DIE IN YOUR RAGE #KUFFARES
Posted by @AlTaifatul11 (November 14, 2015) Did the kuffar think tht they will be left alone after harming us?
Have a taste of ur own medicine #brusselsairport
Posted by @Jundullah40 (March 22, 2016) In the first example, the raised index finger refers to Tawhid ‫ﺗﻮﺣﻴﯿﺪ(‬ ), the fundamental concept in Islam that God is one and absolute. More specifically, Salafi jihadist organizations such as ISIS adhere to a fundamentalist interpretation of Tawhid that rejects non-fundamentalist regimes as idolatrous, demanding destruction.
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In the second example, the author is mocking the police during the Bataclan raid, where the perpetrators (les mecs, the guys) executed their hostages. Urbandictionary.com defines trkl as a French phonetic deformation of tranquille (be calm) and oklm as au calme (be cool). The HATE corpus includes some well-known ISIS supporters, at least in hindsight. Below is an overview of those that we were able to identify using publicly available resources:
• Abu al-Baraa el-Azdi (@AbuAlbaraaSham). Saudi preacher that became the religious judge of the city of Derna in Libya, which he declared to be a franchise of the Islamic State in October 2014.
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• Anjem Choudary (@anjemchoudary). British spokesman of Islam4UK, an activist group in the United Kingdom, who was sentenced to five years and six months in prison on September 6, 2016 on terrorism charges.
• Junaid Hussain (@abuhussain1337_ 
Keyword analysis
What is the probability that a given word occurs in a hateful tweet? While function words such as the and we will occur in any kind of tweet, the rationale is that content words such as football or jihad will occur more often in specific kinds of tweets (i.e., sports tweets vs. hate speech these words do not necessarily need to raise a red flag, but rather a combination of them does, as in: "Die in your rage kuffar!" (Figure 8 ). 
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Figure 9 below provides a random sample of biased words, each with a short description, the probability that a tweet constitutes hate speech if the word appears in it (%) and the total number of times (#) that the word appears in the HATE + SAFE corpora: 
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In the case of emoticons, the raised index finger ( ) has a significant bias (96%) as does the tears of joy ( ) and the arrow pointing down ( ) -in combination with other keywords of course. The arrow down is used to draw attention to new (previously suspended) profiles.
On a general level, the rhetoric in online jihadist hate speech is religiously polarizing, with vitriolic references to Western unbelievers, apostates, crusaders, and so on. This is in line with the proposition that the jihadist narrative attempts to frame an Islam that is under attack by the West, and that all Muslims must unite against it. 35 The global unity is implied by the umma, to which the dawla (state) is a means to an end.
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On a fine-grained level, the keyword analysis exposes unlikely derogatory metaphors, such as coconut, which denotes a so-called moderate: brown (Muslim) on the outside, white (kafir) on the inside. New instances of such inside language use would be hard to uncover by hand.
Automatic prediction
Machine Learning (ML) is a field related to Artificial Intelligence (AI) that uses statistical approaches to "learn by example". For example, when given 10,000 English texts and 10,000
French texts, a machine learning algorithm will automatically discover prevalent linguistic patterns that can then be used to predict whether another text is written in English or in
French (e.g., word endings such as -ized are good cues for English while diacritics such as é and ç are good cues for French).
Machine learning algorithms expect their learning examples to be given as a set of vectors,
where each vector is a set of feature → weight pairs 37 . For text classification, the features could be words, and the weights could be word count. We use character trigrams as features.
Character trigrams are sequences of three successive characters, for example kuffar = { kuf, uff, ffa, far }. The advantage of this approach is that it efficiently models word endings, function words, emoticons, as well as spelling variations (e.g., the vectors for kuffar and kufr have a match on kuf). To prevent overfitting, we anonymized URLs and usernames (e.g., @StaatsNieuws becomes @user) and removed hashtag symbols (#). 
In-domain evaluation
We trained 38 the LIBSVM machine learning algorithm 39 with a balanced training set of 45,000 HATE tweets (approx. 750,000 words) and 45,000 SAFE tweets. The predictive accuracy of the resulting model is 82% (F1-score) . To calculate the F1-score, we applied 3-fold crossvalidation, meaning that we used a different 2/3 of the data for training and 1/3 for validation in three different tests and averaged the results.
Each test will yield true positives (actual HATE tweets predicted as HATE), true negatives (actual SAFE tweets predicted as SAFE), false positives and false negatives. which we can then use to calculate recall (TP / TP + FN) and precision (TP / TP + FP).
Recall corresponds to how many hateful tweets we are able to expose, while precision corresponds to how many we can expose without falsely accusing anyone. For example, a system that flags every tweet as hate exposes all hate speech (high recall) but also calls everyone a jihadist (low precision).
Our model has a recall of 82.26% and a precision of 82.30%. The harmonic mean of both gives the F1-score. The error matrices of TP, TN, FP, FN for the three tests are shown on the right. The F1-score varies across languages, e.g., it is 79% for English, 84% for Arabic and 80% for French (Figure 11 ). While 82% accuracy is encouraging, the caveat is that our test was conducted under lab conditions: using an equal amount of HATE and SAFE tweets. Consequently, the chance of a correct random guess is 50%. In real-life, there will likely be thousands of SAFE tweets for every HATE tweet, making the problem much harder. RT @RidvanMemishi3: Muwahideen leaving in west and europe imediatly should leave, the world is going into chaos west is most propably dangerous area to live.
Posted by @umm_hawla__ (November 3, 2016) 4.2 Cross-domain evaluation
In Machine Learning, "domain adaptation" refers to the problem where a machine learning system appears to perform well on its own training and testing data (in-domain) but poorly on other related data (out-of-domain). We tested the performance of our trained system on the Kaggle ISIS dataset, 40 which has approximately 17,000 pro-ISIS tweets by 100+ authors.
Only a handful of these authors (3) appear in our own corpus, making this a good scalability test. Our system correctly flags 76% of the Kaggle dataset as HATE. About 10% of the data consists of fairly neutral reporting (e.g., news updates by @RamiAlLolah), which the system correctly flags as SAFE, bringing the overall accuracy on the Kaggle dataset to 86%.
OUT-OF-DOMAIN LONG TEXTS
We then tested the performance on 50 jihadist manifestos from JustPaste.it, each containing about 2,500-4,000 words, written in Arabic, French and English (e.g., Impediments of Takfir by Al-Qaeda leader Asim Umar). These were mixed with a random sample of 450 
OUT-OF-DOMAIN SHORT TEXTS
We also tested the performance on 5,000 messages collected from different jihadist Telegram channels, written in Arabic, English, French and Dutch (e.g., Al-Fustaat Dutch) . In this case, the accuracy is 80%. The performance of our system is relatively stable across domains. Finally, a related text analysis study 41 reports a preliminary 98% in-domain accuracy for a system trained on 5,000 English HATE and 3,000 SAFE tweets. This result is remarkable, but may have been prone to overfitting since the dataset is relatively small and spans only two months, i.e., the system might be memorizing the most frequent hashtags used during that time period instead of generalizing from linguistic patterns.
Industry applications
In the rapidly advancing field of Machine Learning, deep learning algorithms are nowadays favored, as they often yield higher accuracy, especially in combination with word embedding techniques. Unfortunately, Deep Neural Networks are also notoriously difficult to interpret.
We have opted to use the more traditional Support Vector Machine (LIBSVM) to allow easy interpretation and reverse engineering of the results. Furthermore, our approach is able to process hundreds of texts in under a second and it can be trained in less than 10 minutes using off-the-shelf electronics, contrary to the processing power required by deep neural nets.
This is advantageous in terms of deployment, since we can retrain with new data in real-time to stay ahead of the evolving rhetoric. We can think of 3 useful applications:
1. Prevention. The system is able to process large quantities of texts in real-time. It can be plugged into the pipeline of social networks such as Twitter to help stop the proliferation of online hate speech. Moderators would see a dashboard of recently flagged tweets up for inspection instead of having to manually sift through thousands of new tweets.
2. Security. The system is small (<100MB) as well as portable (e.g., PyInstaller) and could operate off a USB stick or on a Raspberry Pi. Law enforcement agencies could use it as a sorting algorithm to scan the hard drives of confiscated devices, to get an estimate of which text documents need inspection first.
3. Analysis. The system can be retrained quickly. It can be used as a discovery tool by scholars and Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) personnel to monitor the evolution of jihadist hate speech rhetoric. While according to some media outlets ISIS has been defeated, the struggle between the resilient jihadist vision of a stateless unity of Muslims against the perverted and out-of-control Western culture is not over. (Figure 12 ). On the surface, this profile posed as a neutral reporting agency, while our system flagged 70% of its tweets as suspicious. Most tweets are not blatant hate speech, but contain more subtle hints of jihadist affiliation, such as sporadic references to "the apostates", once sharing a link to the al-Naba newsletter, 43 or distributing inside information with a biased, pro-ISIS undertone:
Pro rebel channels spread the fake news that #IS soldiers threatened they will "rape" rebels women, to justify their continuous failue in #Yarmouk.
Posted by @InsideNewsAg (February 17, 2018) Most tweets are written in Arabic, others in near-perfect English. We discovered a number of idiosyncrasies in the author's English writing style, such as using foto instead of photo (7x), Figure 13 shows a representation 46 of the @Dabiq_Magazine network, displaying users that cite @Dabiq_Magazine and users that in turn cite those users.
The representation exposes a handful of clusters and an "information highway" in the center, but in general it is not very helpful because of its dense structure. Using the Pattern toolkit, we applied eigenvector centrality > 25% as a filter to the Dabiq network to produce Figure 14 . This representation is insightful: displaying the network of influencers that controlled the flow of information about Dabiq magazine around 2015. In this representation, important nodes are bigger, and important information highways are broader. Node labels with eigenvector centrality > 50% have a black background. Several of the displayed profiles (e.g., @anjemchoudary) have indeed been prosecuted in 2016, suggesting that the technique has predictive merit. But manual review is always necessary, since the network may include false positives such as news agencies and experts (e.g., @vicenews and @p_vanostaeyen) that report their findings and in turn get cited by jihadists, as was the case with @p_vanostaeyen. 49 Finally, we wish to point out that a number of studies have also used more specialized methods to analyze terrorist networks, beyond our scope. 50 6 Discussion AI systems can be useful to assist with the detection of online jihadist hate speech. In our work, we have used automated statistical techniques with a stable predictive accuracy of 80%. The idea is not new: more than a decade ago, law experts already discussed the need for regulations and technology against online hate speech. 51 In more recent years, computer scientists have also discussed linguistic methods for the detection of hate speech, noting the absence of robust solutions. 52 More solutions are emerging, but online jihadist hate speech is a relatively new phenomenon, with as of yet no clear regulations or technological solutions.
With this paper, we hope to contribute to the progressive insight. On request we will freely share our data with known intelligence agencies and research institutes.
Future work
We have attempted to automatically detect jihadist rhetoric by examining combinations of words, emoticons and spelling variations. However, present-day online communication involves not just text, but a combination of text, images, video, audio, and so on. Essentially, all communication is multimodal. 53 In future work, we want to examine how the automatic detection can be improved by combining text analysis with image recognition approaches on the set of 10,000 images we have collected.
